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Implementation of Standby




Theresa Morgan, an African-American mother of four, died of
AIDS.' Two years prior to her death, she placed her youngest
child with Diane Peters, a foster mother who intended to adopt all
four of Theresa's children upon her death. Theresa encouraged her
older children's developing relationship with their future foster
mother, and executed a will appointing Diane as the guardian of
her children. Nevertheless, after her death, the court disregarded
Theresa's carefully developed plan and forced her children to
endure two years of uncertainty while litigation about their future
ensued. Theresa's wishes were disregarded largely because she was
a poor, African-American, former drug user who died of AIDS.
Unfortunately, Theresa's children are not alone in their plight.
Increasing numbers of poor families living in inner cities, already
struggling to survive the challenges of poverty and drug use, are
facing the devastation of AIDS. It is estimated that at the end of
1991, 18,500 children and adolescents had been orphaned by the
AIDS epidemic.2 The Orphan Project3 further estimates that by
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Director AIDS
Legal Clinic, Baltimore, Maryland. B.A., State University of New York, 1975; J.D., New
York University School of Law, 1978. I would like to thank Taunya Banks, Karen
Czapanskiy, Stan Herr, Susan Leviton, and Jana Singer for their insightful comments on
earlier drafts of this article.
1. The names of parties involved have been changed to protect their privacy. For
details of this case, which the AIDS Legal Clinic at the University of Maryland School of
Law handled, see infra part IV.A.
2. David Michaels & Carol Levine, Estimates of the Number of Motherless Youth
Orphaned by AIDS in the United States, 268 JAMA 3456, 3457 (1992).
3. The Orphan Project is supported by research grants from a variety of private
foundations, including the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Robert Woods Johnson
Foundation, and the American Foundation for AIDS Research. It is based in New York
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the year 2000, more than 125,000 children in the United States will
have lost their mothers to AIDS.4 The majority of these children
are from poor families where assistance will be necessary during
the course of a parent's illness if these parents are to continue as
primary caretakers. There is also an urgent need to ensure these
children a smooth transition to a new home following the death of
their parents.'
In recognition of the plight of these families, standby guardian-
ship statutes have been enacted in several states. 6 These statutes
enable parents to designate a guardian who is authorized to care
for their children in the event that illness renders the parent unable
to do so. Standby guardianship statutes are designed primarily to
address situations in which single parents are suffering from
terminal illnesses and desire the right to plan for the future of their
children following their deaths.7
While these statutes appear to be an excellent step for allowing
families to plan for the future of their children, barriers to the
appropriate implementation of standby guardianship exist. Thus
far, standby guardianship statutes have received ambivalent support
from departments of social services and foster care networks
because they represent a dramatic departure from the historical
City, and conducts research to gather data to inform public policy decisions.
4. Carol Levine & Gary Stein, ORPHANS OF THE HIV EPIDEMIC: UNMET NEEDS IN
Six CITIES (1994); Michaels & Levine, supra note 2, at 3458. Women of childbearing age
are the fastest growing category of HIV-positive persons in the United States. See generally
Susan L. Waysdorf, Families in the AIDS Crisis: Access, Equality, Empowerment, and the
Role of Kinship Caregivers, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAW 145, 160 (1994). Moreover, AIDS
disproportionately affects poor women of color. E.g., id. at 159. African-American women
comprise approximately 82% of women with AIDS. Eric Harrison, AIDS is No. 1 Killer of
Young Americans; Epidemic: Centers for Disease Control Director Warns Rate of Infection
is Growing in Heterosexual Community, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2. 1994, at 8 (reporting that AIDS
is the leading cause of death among African-American women). A recent study indicates:
"African-American women are disproportionately affected by the acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS) epidemic. Surveillance data for 1994 indicate African-American women
were approximately 16 times more likely to be diagnosed with AIDS than white women.
.... Ralph J. DiClemente & Gina M. Wingood, A Randomized Controlled Trial of an HIV
Sexual Risk-Reduction Intervention for Young African-American Women, 274 JAMA 1271,
1271 (1995).
5. Although there are also many HIV-positive fathers who are the primary caretakers
of their children, for the purposes of the Article, I assume that the mother is the custodial
parent, which is true in the majority of cases.
6. See infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
7. Standby guardianship statutes are, of course, also available and useful to middle- and
upper-middle-class families. However, they are being enacted as a response to the impact
of AIDS on low-income families.
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treatment of poor families by the child welfare system.8 Tradition-
ally, when poor parents become ill, their children are placed with
foster care agencies, and the parents lose much control over their
children's future.9 Many agencies have misgivings about standby
guardianship since standby guardianship statutes provide that
decision-making authority ultimately rests with poor, HIV-positive
individuals.
While in some situations, these misgivings may be warranted,
too often courts, agencies, and social workers unjustly label poor,
HIV-positive parents as bad or incapable, and disregard their roles
in planning for their children's futures. For example, children are
often removed from their mothers because of the family's lack of
suitable housing. The agency that removed the children makes no
meaningful effort to assist the mother in finding new housing.
Courts and social services agencies may presume, often incorrectly,
that the mother is a drug user. In addition, they often assume that
an HIV-positive parent is likely to die quickly, and as a result, that
the children will be better off if placed elsewhere. When such
intervention occurs, an ill parent typically is not offered any
meaningful involvement in planning for the future of her children.
Instead, this parent is often forced to comply with numerous
recommendations from the child welfare agency before her children
may be returned.1" Depriving a parent of the ability to plan for
her children's future is in direct conflict with notions of family
autonomy and parental choice that are respected in the case of
middle-class families." There is no justification for a double
standard for poor, single-parent families. The child welfare system
is not an appropriate or effective forum to resolve issues regarding
parents suffering from terminal illnesses.
8. Cf. Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionnaking: In Search of the Least Drastic
Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745,1809 (1987) (discussing the minimum intervention perspective
with regard to child welfare decision making and its incongruity with the treatment of low-
income parents involved in the child welfare system).
9. See id. at 1809 (stating that parents'who voluntarily place their children with child
welfare agencies often lose legal custody of their children as well as the right to be consulted
about decisions concerning the child's care).
10. See infra part III.A.
11. See Garrison, supra note 8, at 1809 ("Parents with resources to obtain help without
state aid have been permitted to choose the type of care their child receives without
qualification.... These parents lose no legal rights, they may continue to direct the child's
care and upbringing, and, except in extraordinary circumstances, they may also regain
physical custody of the child upon demand.").
1995]
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Standby guardianship statutes offer an alternative for meeting
the needs of terminally ill parents, the children impacted by their
parent's illness, and the prospective guardians for these children.
However, for standby guardianship to succeed, courts and social
services agencies must be willing to accord poor parents a degree
of autonomy that the foster care system has denied them in the
past.
The closest existing analogy to standby guardianship is
testamentary guardianship, in which parents select their children's
custodian by will.'2 This means of selecting a guardian has been
used primarily by middle- and upper-class parents to plan for the
placement of their children following their deaths.13 Guardianship
appointments under testamentary guardianship have historically
been implemented with minimal, if any, review of the parental
appointment. A similar approach is appropriate in the standby
context. Custodial parents are usually best suited to make
decisions regarding future guardianship of their children because of
their knowledge of their children and understanding of their
children's relationship with the potential standby guardian. As a
result, custodial parents are in.the best position to facilitate the
transition to the new caretaker. Standby guardianship can only be
implemented successfully if poor parents are given the same
opportunity as middle- and upper-class parents to make decisions
regarding the placement of their children without extensive review
of this guardianship appointment.
Yet, despite the need for automony in making these guardian-
ship decisions, parents hoping to utilize standby guardianship
statutes will require some assistance. For example, parents will
often be unaware of their legal options when they become ill and
unable to care for their children unless some effort to inform them
is made. Consequently, parents should be advised of the choices
available to them, and offered emotional support in making the
difficult decision to appoint a standby guardian. While not every
parent will be able to deal effectively with the decision to appoint
a standby guardian, many will if given the appropriate tools.
Furthermore, standby guardians will require financial assistance
to enable them to care for their new dependents. The responsibili-
12. See infra part II.B.
13. Low-income parents seldom execute wills because wills are thought of primarily as
a way to distribute property.
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ty of caring for additional children is a major commitment which
will not be possible for many families without some form of
financial assistance. Although the prospect of offering financial
support may appear costly, it is much less expensive than the
alternative: caring for orphaned children through the foster care
system.
Standby guardianship statutes represent an innovative
approach to confronting the problems of poor, single parents
suffering from AIDS. As the AIDS epidemic continues to grow,
these parents must be provided with choices regarding the futures
of their children. Standby guardianship offers an alternative to
state intervention in this arena. This Article analyzes the need for
standby guardianship statutes as a response to the inability and
inappropriateness of the current system in dealing with the
situations of terminally ill and severely disabled parents. Part II
explains the recent enactment and basic provisions of standby
guardianship statutes. Part III discusses the historic treatment of
poor families by the child welfare system and other professionals
involved in the care of children. Using a case example from the
AIDS Legal Clinic at the University of Maryland School of Law,
Part IV illustrates the numerous barriers encountered by poor
parents suffering from AIDS in attempting to plan for their
children's futures. Part V addresses the notion of parental
autonomy and how standby guardianship statutes protect our
traditional belief that decision-making power with respect to
children's welfare should rest with the family. Part VI examines
the benefits that standby guardianship statutes confer upon children
impacted by AIDS by providing them with continuity and stability.
Finally, Part VII analyzes the issues affecting the successful imple-
mentation of standby guardianship statutes.
II. Standby Guardianship Statutes
A. The Basic Framework
New York, with one of the largest populations of women
suffering from AIDS in the United States, 4 was the first state in
the nation to enact a standby guardianship statute.15 Illinois and
14. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Hum. Services, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 18 (June 1995) (showing 3,165 reported
female adult and adolescent AIDS cases from June 1994 to June 1995).
15. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACr LAW § 1726 (Consol. 1992).
1995]
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16Maryland, also major centers of AIDS cases among women,
quickly followed suit." Similar legislation recently has been
passed in California, Connecticut, Florida, New Jersey, and North
Carolina, 8 and bills are pending in a number of other jurisdic-
tions. 9
In general, standby guardianship statutes provide that parents
who are at a substantial risk of becoming ill or disabled within a
limited time period may nominate a "standby guardian" to care for
their children at the point when they become too ill or disabled to
care for them. The standby guardian has concurrent authority with
the parent. Thus, parents do not relinquish any of their authority,
but instead share it with the guardian. Furthermore, if the parents
choose to end the standby's authority, they may do so.
Standby guardianship statutes are necessary because testamen-
tary guardianship statutes take effect only upon the parent's
death.' Prior to the enactment of standby guardianship statutes,
if parents wished to formally grant another person parental
authority over their children while they were still living, they would
be forced to relinquish their own parental authority.2 Tradition-
ally, the law has viewed parenting as an all-or-nothing proposition.
From a legal standpoint, parents are not able to share their
authority or responsibility with non-legal parents, although in
practice this often occurs. For example, grandparents and signifi-
cant others often play a substantial, although not legally recognized,
16. See HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 18 (showing 663 female
adult and adolescent AIDS cases in Maryland and 460 in Illinois reported between July 1994
and June 1995).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 755, para. 11-8.1 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-
901 to -908 (1994). The author testified in support of this legislation in Maryland.
18. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2105 (Deering 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-624 to -624g
(1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 744.304 (1994); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 3B:12-68 to -78 (1995); N.C. GEN
STAT. §§ 35A-1370 to -1382 (1995).
19. See Ga. H.B. 750, 143d Gen. Assembly (1995); Ohio H.B. 288, 121st Gen. Assembly,
1995-1996 Regular Sess. (1995); Tenn. S.B. 442, 99th Gen. Assembly, 1st Regular Sess.
(1995); Tex. S.B. 907, 74th Reg. Sess. (1995).
20. In addition, most testamentary guardianship statutes provide that a "surviving"
parent may execute a will. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.040 (Baldwin 1995); N.J. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-15 (West 1983). If there is a living, though uninvolved parent, as is
frequently the case in the context of families impacted by HIV, the statute technically is
unavailable.
21. Although a "durable power of attorney for decision making for children" exists to
try to assist parents in delegating authority to their family or friends, this is not explicitly




role in caring for children. The concept of standby guardianship is
unique in that it permits parents to receive assistance to care for
their children without depriving them of custody of the child.
Thus, the all-or-nothing view of parenting is slowly being modified
to conform with reality.
22
For a parent suffering from a serious illness or disabling
condition, the flexibility of the "standby" notion is essential.'
Often there are times when the parent is temporarily unable to
function, and the standby guardian can step in. When and if these
parents then recover, they can resume their parenting function
without court involvement.
In many cases, these statutes simply authorize legal recognition
of an already existing situation. Many parents who have become
ill with AIDS turn to other family members for assistance in caring
for their children.24 Others seek the assistance of a friend or
neighbor. Standby guardianship statutes give these extended family
members or friends authority to make decisions affecting the
welfare of the children, including such things as enrolling children
in school or making decisions about medical treatment for the
children.
B. Standby Statutes, Testamentary Guardianship, and the
Appropriate Standard of Review
Testamentary guardianship is currently the closest analogy to
standby guardianship. Testamentary guardianship historically has
22. The current trend towards permitting open adoption in cases in which birth parents
and adoptive parents agree to adoption is another example of the recognition that a child
may benefit from having multiple parental figures in her life. The historical model of
parenting does not meet the reality of many of today's families (if it ever did), and the law
must change to meet these realities. See Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. LJ. 459,469-82 (1990). The law's historical insistence that
each child must have two parents of the opposite sex, no more and no less, does a great
disservice to children and their families. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood
as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear
Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); see also Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers'
Rights, Adoption and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 60 (1995).
23. See Arlene Zarembka & Katherine M. Franke, Women in the AIDS Epidemic: A
Portrait of Unmet Needs, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 519, 536, 539-40 (1990).
24. See Waysdorf, supra note 4, at 177 ("Increasingly, mothers with AIDS rely on their
own mothers, aunts and other, usually elderly, relatives for support and caretaking. These
mothers usually prefer that their relatives and close family friends care for their children
when they are no longer able to do so.").
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been implemented with minimal, if any, review of parental appoint-
ments of guardians. This mechanism has been used primarily by
middle- and upper-class parents who execute wills, which are
probated through the Orphan's Court division. Maryland's
testamentary guardianship statute,25 for example, provides that
surviving parents may appoint a testamentary guardian for their
children. Under the Maryland statute, such a guardian "need not
be approved by or qualify in any court."26 Generally, meaningful
review of a testamentary guardianship appointment only occurs if
a relative contests the parent's choice of guardian. Courts differ at
that point in determining what standard of review is appropriate.27
Both testamentary and standby guardianship statutes should be
subject to the same standard of review. Deference to the parent's
appointment is appropriate, because that parent typically will be
the person with the most knowledge and control to facilitate a good
choice. For poor families, the question of who should be the
primary decision maker for the children usually does not pit family
members against each other. Rather, poor families often must
challenge state intervention to retain control over this decision. In
most cases, the family will be better equipped to make the
appropriate decision regarding placement for these children.
Therefore, the parent's appointment should be honored unless
there is evidence that the parent's choice would in fact be detri-
mental to the child.
III. The Historic Failure To Respect the Autonomy of Poor
Families
For the notion of standby guardianship to work effectively,
both social workers and the courts must be prepared to defer to
plans prepared by poor, HIV-positive parents for their children.
Under some standby guardianship statutes, the individual chosen
by the parent to act as the guardian already will have acted in this
28capacity for months before any judicial review occurs. If a court
25. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-701 (1991).
26. Id.
27. Annotation, Function, Power, and Discretion of Court Where There Is a Testamentary
Appointment of Guardian of Minor, 67 A.L.R. 2d 803 (1959).
28. Maryland's new standby guardianship statute provides that a parent may appoint a
standby guardian and that the guardian may begin to function when a physician confirms that
the parent is debilitated and unable to care for her children. Court confirmation need not
occur for up to six months thereafter. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-901 to -908
[Vol. 100:1
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later were to step in and substitute its judgment for that of the
deceased parent, the results could be devastating for the children
involved. Thus, a major change in the current attitude towards
low-income parents is needed to facilitate the use of standby
guardianship.
Despite notions of respect for family autonomy, the state has
intervened repeatedly in the lives of poor families. Beginning with
the Poor Laws in England, children of poor parents have been
removed from their families without parental consent.29 Even
today, abuse and neglect laws, which allegedly were enacted to
protect all children from abuse or neglect, are enforced principally
against poor parents.3" Thus, the values of family autonomy,
privacy, and parental authority that govern elsewhere in our legal
system have been essentially ignored by the child welfare system
when dealing with poor families.3
Poor families, and particularly single mothers, are more likely
than middle-class parents to be enmeshed in the child welfare
system for several reasons. First, poor families are more often the
recipients of public benefits and, thus, are more often in regular
contact with social workers who have the opportunity to scrutinize
(1994).
29. See Martin Guggenheim, The Political and Legal Implication of the Psychological
Parenting Theory, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 549 (1983-84); Garrison, supra note
8, at 1750. Like today's child welfare laws, the Poor Laws allegedly served a "public need"
by placing children in apprenticeship programs until they reached the age of majority. See
id. at 1750.
30. See Guggenheim, supra note 29; Randall R. McCathren, Accountability in the Child
Protection System:" A Defense of the Proposed Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect, 57
B.U. L. REV. 707, 711-12 n.16 (1977); Garrison, supra note 8, at 1751-52.
A study of black children in foster care in five cities, including Detroit, Houston,
Miami, New York, and Seattle, found that Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) was the principal source of income for 65% of these children's birth families. No
income information was available for 30% of the families. NATIONAL BLACK CHILD DEV.
INST., WHO WILL CARE WHEN PARENTS CAN'T? A STUDY OF BLACK CHILDREN IN
FOSTER CARE (1989) [hereinafter STUDY OF BLACK CHILDREN N FOSTER CARE]. The
typical household in the study was headed by a young mother. The "typical mother in the
study was black, single, under 30, had two or more children, less than a high school
education, little or no experience, and AFDC as the primary source of income at the time
of placement." Id.
31. Garrison, supra note 8, at 1768-69. Garrison describes how, with the exception of
the child welfare system, "our legal tradition has generally accepted the premise that parents
have a paramount claim to the care and custody of their minor children in all but exceptional
circumstances." Id. at 1769.
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their living situations.32 Often, these social workers apply their
own middle-class value systems and find the family living situation
among poor families inadequate.
Second, physicians, social workers, and other professionals are
reluctant to report neglect or abuse by middle- and upper-class
families except in clear-cut cases. These individuals are reluctant
to report people they perceive as similar to themselves and may not
wish to disrupt their relationships with paying clients.33 They also
may fear retaliation by the family, especially if the suspected abuse
or neglect is not confirmed. For these middle- and upper-class
families, child care professionals are more likely to pursue other
avenues, such as referring family members for counseling, when
they suspect abuse or neglect. However, no such reluctance to
report exists where poor families are concerned.34 For example,
health care professionals are much more likely to report drug use
by poor, black women than they are to report similar drug patterns
by white, wealthy patients. 35 A recent study documents this bias
in the reporting of pregnant women and their drug use by medical
providers in Florida.36
Finally, poor families are more likely to be involved in the
child welfare system because when crisis hits, poor families often
have limited resources upon which to rely. Loss of a job quickly
leads to loss of a home. Children are removed from their parents
because of the parents' inability to provide adequate shelter.37
The preferable response to such a crisis would be to assist the
32. "Because welfare families are subject to supervision by social workers, instances of
perceived neglect are more likely to be reported to governmental authorities than neglect
on the part of more affluent parents." Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1440-41 (1991). Roberts also describes how black children are more likely to be removed
by the child welfare system, due to the system's lack of respect for and understanding of the
role of the extended family in the black community. Id. at 1441.
33. See Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug Use During Pregnancy and
Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1202, 1205-06 (1990).
34. Carol B. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 546 (1983-84).
35. Roberts, supra note 32, at 1433.
36. Chasnoff et al., supra note 33.
37. Homelessness was cited as a factor in 11% of cases in which the child was placed
in foster care. Inadequate shelter was cited in an additional 30% of cases. STUDY OF
BLACK CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, supra note 22.
[Vol. 100:1
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family in finding shelter, but unfortunately, this is not how the
current system works.
38
A. Disparate Treatment of Low-Income Parents
If a doctor disagrees with a middle-class parent's decision
about medical care for a child, and fears the child's life is endan-
gered, the doctor is likely to talk with counsel for the hospital and
seek court authority to override the parent's decision.39 The child
remains in the legal custody of the parent, and the court focuses on
the narrow legal issue of appropriate medical care for the child.4
However, in the case of a poor parent's decision concerning
medical care for a child, that doctor is much more likely to contact
Protective Services (the agency which enforces abuse and neglect
statutes), and request its intervention.41 Typically, if the doctor
reports that the parent's failure to agree to certain medical care will
endanger the child, the child will be removed from the parent's
custody, and placed in foster care pending the outcome of legal
proceedings.
4 2
38. Although, in theory, under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. § 620 (1988), the agency is charged with making reasonable efforts to avoid
removal of the child, in practice this rarely happens. In the case of LaShawn A. v. Dixon,
762 F. Supp. 959, 970-71 (D. D.C. 1991), affd in part and remanded in part, 990 F.2d 1319
(D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994), the court concluded:
Because the CFSD [Child and Family Services Division] is unable to provide many
direct services and does not have any priority access agreements with other
agencies or organizations, defendants have candidly admitted that the CFSD has
insufficient service resources to make the reasonable efforts requirement of federal
law. ... The result has been an increased risk of arbitrary or inappropriate
placements as well as an increased cost to the District.
Funding and reimbursement policies at the federal level continue to encourage placement
of children in foster care, as opposed to provision of services to the home. Federal funding
of foster care is an open-ended entitlement, whereas funding for services designed to keep
families together is limited. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform:
Revolutionizing the Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 19
(1995) (and sources cited therein).
39. See Note, Judicial Limitations on Parental Autonomy in the Medical Treatment of
Minors, 59 NEB. L. REV. 1093 (1980) (and cases cited therein).
40. Garrison, supra note 8, at 1769 n.110. Garrison notes that the limits of parental
decision making have been tested primarily in the realm of medical decision making.
However, typically, in this context, the court does not deprive parents of custody of their
children, as has occurred to HIV-positive parents. The court simply orders what it believes
to be appropriate treatment to protect the child's life. See, e.g., Matter of Hofbauer, 393
N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979); Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978).
41. See Roberts, supra note 32, at 1430-33. This has also been our experience in the
AIDS clinic in representing poor, HIV-positive mothers.
42. See supra note 41.
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When a child is placed in foster care, regardless of whether the
placement results from a charge of abuse or neglect against a
parent or from a parent's illness and inability to care for the child,
the parent loses much control over subsequent events.43 For
example, the parent relinquishes the ability to determine when the
child will be returned and is not consulted about decisions affecting
the child's welfare." Communication between parent and foster
43. See Duchesne v. Sugerman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing a mother of two
children, placed by an agency when the mother was hospitalized, who spent years attempting
to regain custody); Matter of Sajivini K., 391 N.E.2d 1316 (N.Y. 1979) (concerning a mother
who voluntarily placed child for financial reasons, but contributed to the child's support and
visited regularly, and who was unable to regain custody for nine years).
Although problems such as these theoretically were addressed by the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 620-28 (1995), and the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101-06 (1995), the problems continue. In a
recent class action brought on behalf of foster children against the District of Columbia's
Department of Human Services, the court concluded "that the CFSD has consistently failed
to comply with the statutory time limits regarding voluntary and emergency care. The result
has been a state of limbo for these children who, while in emergency care do not have any
case plans prepared on their behalf." LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 971 (D. D.C.
1991). The court went on to note that "the average stay for children in the District's foster
care system is just under five years - a third of their childhoods." Id. at 973.
Despite litigation, the District of Columbia has failed to improve its performance and
implement court ordered changes. After four years of attempting to get the city into
compliance, Federal Judge Thomas F. Hogan finally seized control of the agency from the
District of Columbia government. Toni Locy, Federal Court Seizes Control of D.C. Child
Welfare System, WASH. POST, May 23, 1995, at Al; see also Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 877
F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (pertaining to a class action alleging failure of Milwaukee
County Foster Care System to provide adequate services to children and their families to
allow children to return home); Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (alleging a
variety of systemic problems with the child welfare system operated by Philadelphia's
Department of Human Services, including failure to make reasonable efforts to return
children to their homes as quickly as possible, as mandated by the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980).
44. Marsha Garrison explains:
When a child entered foster care, whether by court order or voluntary placement,
the parent was required to cede legal custody - the right to decide where the
child lives and the kind of care he will receive - to the state's foster care agency.
The agency thereafter decided where the child would reside and how long he
would remain there; the parent retained no right to be consulted on decisions
about the child's care or, typically, to regain custody without agency or court
approval. This usurpation of the parental role was invariable. Parents who
voluntarily placed their children, no matter what the reason for placement or their
parenting ability, lost custody rights just like parents who had been found unfit.
Garrison, supra note 8, at 1755-56. Even though in theory a parent's rights may not be
terminated without due process, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18
(1981), once a child enters foster care, regardless of the reason, the parent effectively loses
control. Although the parent retains some rights, such as the right to make medical
decisions, the agency will often ask the parent to assign that right to them, and if the parent
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parent is typically discouraged. Agencies rarely attempt to facilitate
meaningful visits between parent and child.45 The normal visit is
often a two-hour meeting at the Department of Social Services
(DSS). This visit takes place once a week at most, but often occurs
less frequently.4 6  The foster care system usually presumes it is
dealing with a bad, or at best, an inadequate parent, and accords
that parent no respect or authority.47
The families that should benefit most by standby guardianship
statutes are the same families that have historically experienced
frequent, and often unhelpful, intervention by the child welfare
system.48 This "bad parent" presumption occurs even more
refuses, will ask the court to grant them that authority. If the parent should die while the
child is in custody, it is most often the foster care agency, not the mother's wishes, that will
dictate where the child is placed.
45. See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 423, 429
(1983).
46. A consent decree entered into in L.J. v. Massinga, 699 F. Supp. 508, 521 (D. Md.
1988), affd, 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989), provided that
"[i]n all cases in which the goal is to return a foster child to his or her biological home,
defendants shall make reasonable efforts to facilitate weekly visits between the parent and
child, unless the juvenile court orders otherwise .... "
In Winston v. Children and Youth Services, 948 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
504 U.S. 956 (1992), the plaintiffs challenged the visitation policy and practice of the
Children and Youth Services of Delaware County as a violation of the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Acts. The policy provided for a one-hour visit every two weeks, as a
minimum for all cases. Id. at 1388. The court found that this was not a violation of federal
law.
47. See Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J.
274 (1991). Fineman describes how poor single mothers, if they are not single as a result of
death (or perhaps divorce) are deemed "bad" mothers. Id. at 282, 283. Dorothy Roberts
describes the myth of the "bad" black woman that developed during slavery. Slave women
were not permitted to function as nurturing mothers and companions to their fathers or
husbands. They were often raped by their owners and compelled to bear children from
whom they were later separated. The myth of the loose black woman has been deliberately
perpetuated until today. Roberts, supra note 32, at 1438-39.
48. Abuses by juvenile court judges who were inappropriately interfering with poor
families were recognized by the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, which responded with the following guidance for judges:
A presumption for parental autonomy conforms with our legal and political
commitments to privacy, freedom of religion, and diversity of ideas. When coercive
intervention is expanded, these important values may be eroded. Extensive state
involvement in child-rearing may jeopardize the important diversity that is fostered
by allowing parents to raise children in accordance with their own particular
feelings and belief.
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
STANDARDS FOR THE ADMIN. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1980).
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frequently where HIV-positive parents are concerned.49 Society
immediately presumes that these parents have acted irresponsibly
or are drug users, and therefore are incapable of parenting. In
addition, it is often assumed that these parents are likely to die
soon, and therefore, their roles in their children's lives are
insignificant. As a consequence, their wishes as parents are
accorded little, if any, respect. 0 These parents have frequent
contact with social workers from various state agencies due to both
their poverty and their HIV disease. As a result, their parenting
abilities, living situation, and so forth are subjected to much closer
scrutiny than the average middle-class parent.
B. Illustrations
The AIDS Legal Clinic at the University of Maryland School
of Law has encountered numerous cases in which Protective
Services workers and the courts have excluded HIV-positive
parents from participating in decisions affecting the welfare of their
children to the detriment of all involved. In one such AIDS Clinic
case, a mother threatened to remove her son from the hospital
where he was being treated because the hospital placed a "blood
and body fluids precautions" sign on the door. She felt that this
was a breach of both her and her son's confidentiality." A report
was made by a physician to Protective Services that the mother was
threatening to remove her child against medical advice, and that
she had been erratic and unreliable in bringing him to clinic
appointments. No meaningful attempt was made to meet with the
parent and discuss underlying concerns prior to the filing of the
report.
At the next level, rather than investigating the underlying
problems, the Protective Services worker merely accepted the
physician's report and removed the child. Later it became clear
that the mother was having a difficult time bringing her child to the
medical clinic because it was a painful reminder to her of her son's
49. ScoTT BURRIS ET AL., AIDS LAW TODAY: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 229-31
(1993).
50. Because of its historic lack of respect for parents, many parents are very rehictant
to turn to the foster care system when they need assistance. See, e.g., Mother Dying of AIDS
Struggles to Find Home for Her Son, BALT. SUN, Jan. 15, 1993, at 1; Woman Ill with AIDS
Seeks Home for Her Child, BALT. SUN, Mar. 9, 1993, at 1.




illness, for which she felt responsible. What was needed was
intervention by an empathetic counselor, not removal of the
woman's child. The child had not been in danger, and removal was
clearly unwarranted. 2
In another AIDS Clinic case, an HIV-positive mother
voluntarily brought her eight-year-old child to the hospital for
evaluation when he began acting out, and she was having difficulty
controlling his behavior. Upon evaluation, it appeared that his
actions stemmed at least in part from his knowledge of his mother's
HIV status and his fear that she would die. After thirty days of
hospitalization, the treating psychiatrist recommended a longer
placement at a residential treatment center for boys. The mother
objected, and the psychiatrist called Protective Services who
intervened, and placed the child against the mother's wishes.
Although the mother acted responsibly when she initially had the
child evaluated, the psychiatrist and Protective Services refused to
honor her wish to have the child returned to the home.
The AIDS Legal Clinic at the University of Maryland School
of Law represented the mother, but it was over a year until the
child was returned to his home. This delay was due primarily to
the actions of Protective Services which continually raised new
hurdles for the mother to overcome to have her child returned.
For example, the agency required the mother to complete parenting
classes, attend individual therapy, and improve her housing
situation. In the interim, Protective Services made little or no
effort to facilitate visitation between the mother and her son,
despite the child's persistent requests to go home and his desire for
holiday visits. There were no allegations of abuse or neglect in this
case; the sole problem was the mother's difficulty controlling her
son's erratic behavior.
Removal of the child was extraordinarily damaging in this
context. Part of the child's fear centered around losing his mother.
Legal scholars have similarly observed that the system removes
52. In another such case handled by the AIDS clinic, a mother had reluctantly agreed
to enroll her daughter in an experimental drug protocol. When she failed to bring the child
in consistently for her appointments, a Protective Services report was made, and the child
was removed.
These do not appear to be isolated incidents. Fortunately, in both of these cases
sympathetic family members took care of the children until the clinic was able to persuade
the court to return them to the care of their mothers. But the removal and accompanying
trauma to both mother and child could have been avoided.
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children from their homes without sufficiently exhausting other
alternatives, and leaves them to languish in foster care too long,
resulting in more harm for the child.53
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 198054
was intended to address these systemic problems. Unfortunately,
it has failed to do so. This failure is in part due to the Act's lack
of an enforcement mechanism capable of compelling state agencies
to comply with its provisions. In addition, the federal funding
scheme encourages placement of children in foster care, as opposed
to providing services to the family at home." As a result, there
has been an increase in the need for foster care. 6
IV. Lack of Respect for Poor Families Acts as a Barrier to the
Successful Implementation of Standby Guardianship
The cases described above are just a few examples of the child
welfare and judicial system's lack of respect for the wishes and
parenting skills of HIV-positive parents. The concern is that this
lack of respect will prevent the effective implementation of the new
standby guardianship statutes. As the following case study
illustrates, this has already occurred in cases involving testamentary
guardianship statutes.
A. Case Study: Theresa Morgan
In 1990, the AIDS Legal Clinic at the University of Maryland
School of Law was contacted by a client named Theresa Morgan.57
She was a recovering drug user who was HIV positive and
symptomatic, but had not yet been diagnosed with AIDS. Theresa
had two older children, Brandon and Kimberly, ages five and eight,
living with her. She placed two younger children in foster care at
53. See, e.g., Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975); Robert H. Mnookin,
Foster Care - In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973); Michael S. Wald,
State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children
from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
54. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
55. Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform: Revolutionizing the Most
Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 18-20 (1995).
56. Id.
57. Names have been changed to protect client confidentiality.
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birth. One of those children, Kevin, died of AIDS at the age of
three and a half while with his foster family. The other child,
Angela, was healthy, and remained with a foster mother who hoped
to adopt her with Theresa's support and encouragement. Despite
discouragement by DSS, the foster mother, Diane Peters, and
Theresa became friends. As Theresa became more ill, the foster
mother assisted her with the two older children, transporting them
to school, taking them occasionally on weekends, etc. Ultimately,
Theresa and Diane agreed that upon Theresa's death, the older
children would also be placed with Diane, and eventually adopted
by her. As such, Theresa executed a will appointing Diane as
guardian of the two older children. In addition, Theresa and Diane
signed an open adoption agreement, which provided Theresa
ongoing visitation with her youngest daughter, even after the
adoption became final. The agreement further provided that
Theresa's extended family should have ongoing visits with all of the
children, even after Theresa's death.
Theresa explained these arrangements to her children and
encouraged their developing relationship with Diane. Upon
Theresa's death, Diane assumed physical custody of the two oldest
children, pursuant to Theresa's will. No one in Theresa's family
expressed any interest in caring for the children at that time.
In the meantime, a study of Diane's home had been completed
by the DSS, which approved her home as an adoptive placement.
Termination of the father's rights occurred with regard to the
youngest child in March 1993. Thus, the path was clear to finalize
the child's adoption by Diane, who had already received approval
by DSS.
However, when DSS learned of Theresa's death, an attorney
for the Department became concerned about whether the two older
children were "legally protected." The DSS attorney gave no
credence to the will that Theresa had executed. Through a social
worker, the DSS attorney asked Diane to consent to legal commit-
ment of the two older children to DSS with continued placement
with Diane. Diane was told that the Department would then assist
her in adopting these two children as well. In the meantime, Diane
would qualify for foster care payments. Not surprisingly, Diane
agreed.
Shortly thereafter, paternal relatives contacted DSS to inquire
into the whereabouts of Angela, the youngest child, who had been
freed for adoption. A paternal aunt, whom the child had never
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met, was interested in adopting her. When DSS explained that
keeping the children together as a family unit was a priority, the
paternal relatives indicated their interest in adopting all three
children, including Brandon, who had a different father and had no
legal or emotional relationship to this family. The paternal
relatives had no contact with the children for many years, and only
limited contact for a period of months when the two older children
were very young.
At a review hearing on the status of the older children's
placement, the judge permitted the paternal relatives to appear and
express their desires with regard to custody. The judge permitted
Diane Peters, the foster mother, to intervene in the proceeding, but
denied her motion to rescind commitment of the two older children
to DSS so that she might continue to pursue adoption independent-
ly. The judge refused to recognize that the deceased mother,
Theresa Morgan, had appointed a testamentary guardian for her
children, and that the guardian already had been acting in that role
for several months. The court rescinded limited guardianship in the
foster mother for medical and psychiatric treatment and out-of-
state travel, and transferred this guardianship to DSS. The court
then ordered monthly visitation for both Brandon and Kimberly
with the paternal relatives. Finally, the foster mother was instruct-
ed not to discuss future custody plans with the children, despite
counsel's argument that the children were upset by the uncertainty
that the visits with paternal relatives were creating. The children
were willing to engage in these visits, but wanted assurances that
the new home, which they had settled into following their mother's
death over a year before, would not be disturbed. The court's
intention appeared to be to facilitate the development of a
relationship with the children's paternal relatives with a future
change in custody as a likely possibility,, pursuant to DSS's
suggestion.
The court refused to recognize the will Theresa Morgan had
executed appointing Diane Peters guardian of her children.
Neither the deceased mother's wishes, nor her valiant attempts to
provide a smooth transition to a new home for her children, were
seriously considered by the court. Nor was there any recognition
of the children's desire to remain together in the home of their
foster parent.
A further complication in this situation, which undoubtedly
impacted on the judge's decision, was the fact that the foster
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mother was Caucasian, while the children and the paternal relatives
were African American. This issue was not directly discussed, but
it was clearly a concern among the parties. Positions broke down
entirely on racial grounds as Caucasian advocates supported
guardianship by the foster mother, while African-American
advocates favored exploring the award of custody to the paternal
relatives.58 This racial division occurred regardless of whom the
individuals represented. 9
Part of the irony of this case is that the court recognized that
the extended family had no independent legal standing to be heard
in this situation. They were permitted to be heard because of the
father's wishes that they be considered (even though his paternal
rights as to the youngest child had been terminated due to his
abandonment of the child), and because of the policy of DSS to
explore relative placements prior to placing a child in a non-relative
foster home.' °
58. The National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) is vehemently opposed
to transracial adoption. NATIONAL ASS'N OF BLACK SOC. WORKERS, PRESERVING AFRICAN
AMERICAN FAMILIES (Apr. 1991) (paper on file with author). The NABSW takes the
position that transracial adoption is not only harmful to children and to the African-
American community, but is also unnecessary. The group argues that African-American
children are improperly removed from their homes due to poverty, a concern that could and
should be remedied by supplying adequate resources to the families. If existing African-
American families were strengthened and supported, the need for adoption and foster care
would decrease. Additionally, the association maintains that qualifications for adoptive
families are unduly restrictive and screen out many African Americans, such as those who
are over the age of 55 or are single, who would make fine adoptive parents. Finally, the
NABSW argues that transracial adoptions contribute to the erosion of the black community.
The association believes that African-American children must be raised by African-American
families where "they belong physically, psychologically, and culturally in order that they
receive the total sense of themselves and develop a secure projection of their future." Id.
However, the NABSW position paper does not address the issue of the right of terminally
ill African-American parents to determine the future guardian of their children. The concern
about the state improperly removing children is not present here.
Commentators have challenged NABSW's position, arguing it unnecessarily deprives
African-American children of loving, permanent homes. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Where
Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1163 (1991). Other commentators are more sympathetic to NABSW's position, but reject
an absolutist approach as damaging to individual children. Margaret Howard, Transracial
Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (1984);
Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion,
29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990-1991).
59. For example, the attorney for DSS, who was Caucasian, was inclined to allow Diane
to proceed with her plan to adopt all of the children. However, she was persuaded by the
social worker involved, an African American, to support the paternal aunt's intervention.
60. Because the Maryland Code speaks only of relative placements or fostercare, DSS
takes the position that non-relative placements are not an option.
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If the paternal relatives had proceeded in Orphan's Court in
a guardianship proceeding to challenge the mother's appointment,
it is unlikely that they would have received anything more than a
perfunctory hearing. They had no relationship with any of the
children, and the children were doing well in their new home.
Diane was the only parent the youngest child, Angela, had ever
known. The father's paternal rights as to Angela had been
terminated. Traditionally, this would result in the termination of
any relationship with the extended family as well.61
Despite the court's actions, Maryland's testamentary guardian
statute gives a parent an absolute right to appoint a guardian. The
statute provides that "unless prohibited by agreement or court
order, the surviving parent of a minor may appoint by will one or
more guardians and successor guardians of the person of an
unmarried minor. The guardian need not be approved by or
qualify in any court."6 From the time Theresa executed her will
until the time of her death, she had full legal and physical custody.
There was no court order in effect regarding either Brandon or
Kimberly. Brandon's father was deceased. Kimberly's father was
living, but had no contact with her for many years. However, even
when there is a surviving father, as with Kimberly, Maryland courts
have given due consideration to a custodial mother's wishes as
expressed in her will.63
Nevertheless, because Theresa was a poor, black, single parent,
and a recovering drug user with AIDS, the juvenile court chose to
disregard Theresa's expressed wishes and her plan for her children,
which already had been implemented and in operation for over a
year. The claimed authority of DSS involvement was that the
children were not "legally protected." However, by virtue of
Theresa's will, the children had a legal guardian. If this same
reasoning were applied across the board, all children who have lost
both parents should be declared Children in Need of Assistance
(CINA) immediately at the time of their parents' death.64 This
61. This is another area in which flexibility is needed. Family law's tendency to require
rigid role definitions, e.g., "either you maintain physical custody of this child or your rights
will be terminated," does not address the realities faced by poor families.
62. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-701 (1994).
63. Newkirk v. Newkirk, 535 A.2d 947 (Md. 1988).
64. The court also appeared to have justified its intervention because there had been
an Order of Protective Supervision in 1990, placing Theresa and her children under the
watchful eye of DSS. This was a result of Theresa's testing positive for cocaine at the time
of Angela's birth. However, Theresa entered drug treatment in 1991, and did not, according
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does not occur where middle-class children are concerned; the will




Ultimately, DSS recommended that all three children be
placed with their paternal aunt. The principal concern appeared to
be the importance of African-American children living with an
African-American family. However, the attorney for the foster
mother introduced a psychiatrist who evaluated all three children
in their foster placement. She found that they had adjusted well to
this new home and wished to remain there. As a result, the judge
who heard the trial on the merits rejected DSS's recommendations
and allowed the children to remain with their foster mother, who
then adopted all three children. However, the children were put
through needless trauma and uncertainty, particularly at a time
when they needed stability and support to grieve the death of their
mother.
Unfortunately, DSS and the first judge's failure to give any
serious consideration to Theresa's plan for her children is not
unusual. This could occur in a variety of different ways, such as
unnecessary Protective Services intervention when the parent has
already established a plan for her children's future under the
standby guardianship statute, or by the courts' disregard of a
parent's plan after her death. Substantial education is necessary to
persuade judges, attorneys, and social workers to defer to a
parent's appointment, unless good cause exists for not doing so.
Presumptions about an individual's parenting ability should not be
made based on economic status or the presence of HIV. Parents
should be encouraged to make plans for their children, which will
benefit those children by reducing the need for abrupt removal and
placement in foster care.
to her account and that of her family and friends, use drugs for the balance of her life. The
Order of Protective Supervision terminated in 1991. The court's intervention took place in
1993.
65. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-701 (1995).
19951
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
V. Standby Guardianship Protects Traditional Notions of
Parental Autonomy
Traditionally, parental decisions with respect to the welfare of
their children have been given great deference. Our society
embraces the principle that families, as opposed to the state, are
best suited to raise children.66 Because of our cultural diversity,
families differ in their manner of raising children, the values they
stress, and the importance of extended versus nuclear family.
There is no societal consensus about the best way to raise a child
or what disciplinary methods parents should use. State intervention
into the family situation is typically limited to the contexts of abuse
and neglect, "abandonment, child behavior problems, a parent's
mental or physical illness .... ," and medical decision making.
when the life of a child may be directly endangered.
With the exception of the poor, families generally are left to
raise children as they see fit.' This principle is an illustration of
66. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of
Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975 (1988). The notion of parental autonomy has
constitutional dimensions. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923), and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925), the Supreme Court stressed the importance
of parental autonomy in decisions about education for their children. The Court, recognized,
however, that it must balance a countervailing state interest in the child's welfare. In Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), for example, the Court held that a parent's religious
principles could not overcome the state's interest in protecting a child's welfare where child
labor was involved. In the more recent case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the
Supreme Court upheld the right of Amish families to prevent their children from continuing
with public education beyond eighth grade. Only the dissent in Yoder recognized that the
child had a separate interest that the Court should recognize. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Recent cases involving minors and the right to an abortion have recognized a child's
separate interest. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976), and Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), the Supreme Court recognized that a child has a privacy
interest separate from her parents that must be considered in the abortion context. A
"mature minor" is capable of making an informed decision about whether or not to have an
abortion, and her privacy must be respected.
Another important concept in Supreme Court abortion cases, including Danforth and
Bellotti, is that a parent may not always make a decision in the child's best interests, and that
this necessitates some review or involvement by some other authority figure. Danforth, 428
U.S. at 74; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 613-17 (1979), the
Court found that review by the medical director to ascertain the necessity of committing a
child to a psychiatric facility was sufficient review of parental decision making.
67. See Garrison, supra note 8, at 1749.
68. Intact traditional nuclear families are historically given more deference than single-
parent families, particularly those headed by women. Martha Fineman, Images of Mothers
in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991).
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our society's diversity and appears to stem from our faith in the
ability of parents to know their children best and do what is best
for them.69 This deference is also, in part, a result of the historical
notion of children as property of their parents.
70
Many testamentary guardianship statutes reflect this attitude
of deference to parental decision making in the context of planning
for children after the death of their parents. For example,
Maryland's testamentary guardianship statute provides that a
guardian appointed in a parent's will "need not be approved by or
qualify in any court. 'M Typically, there is no substantial review
of the parent's appointment. Review usually occurs only when
there is a contest, as when a grandmother seeking custody for
herself challenges the parent's appointment of another relative. A
question then arises as to what standard of review should apply.
The answer varies substantially from state to state.72 Courts
differ in the weight they give to the parent's preference. Some
courts will confirm the parent's appointment, absent evidence that
the appointment will be detrimental to the child." Others will
conduct an independent review to determine what guardianship
situation will be in the child's best interest.74  These courts
69. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602, quoted in Stanley N. Katz, Legal History and Family
History: The Child, the Family, and the State, 21 B.C. L. Rev. 1025, 1026 (1990).
70. See Linda S. Ewald, Medical Decision Making for Children: An Analysis of
Competing Interests, 25 ST. LouiS U. L.J. 689, 689-95 (1982); McCarthy, supra note 66, at
975-80; Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal
Matrix and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 293-95 (1972).
71. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRuSm § 13-701 (1991).
72. See Annotation, Function, Power and Discretion of Court Where There Is a
Testamentary Appointment of Guardian of Minor, 67 A.L.R.2d 803 (1959). There are
relatively few reported cases in this area, and the courts have done only a minimal analysis
of what standard should apply.
73. E.g., Ex parte McCoun, 150 P. 516 (Kan. 1915); In re Young's Estate, 9 Alaska 158
(1937).
74. E.g., In re Walsh's Estate, 223 P.2d 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950). In this case, the court
refused to carry out the father's wishes appointing his parents as guardians for his two sons.
The court instead appointed the boys' maternal grandparents on grounds that they were
better able to care for children. Financial status appeared to be major consideration for the
court. See also Lippincott v. Lippincott, 128 A. 254 (N.J. Eq. 1925); In re Estate of Suggs,
501 N.E.2d 307 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (court should consider best interest of child; all other
things being equal, wish of parent prevails).
Interestingly, testamentary guardian statutes are rooted in the 19th century, an era in
which married women were not treated as independent legal persons. Fathers had full
custody and control over the children, even though mothers typically had primary child care
responsibilities. The father was given authority to decide who should be the guardian for the
children upon his death, and often the mother was excluded from this role, or conditions
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consider the parent's wishes as just one factor to be considered in
the overall evaluation. As a practical matter, however, meaningful
review of a middle-class parent's testamentary appointment takes
place only if another family member contests the appointment in
court. In most cases, the parent's choice is automatically upheld
with minimal or no investigation.75
In the context of both testamentary guardianship and standby
guardianship, deference to a parent's choice, absent evidence that
it may be detrimental to the child, is the appropriate standard to
apply. Parents generally have the best opportunity to develop a
thorough knowledge of their children. They are most familiar with
their children's temperaments, personalities, and concerns. They
also understand their children's relationships with friends and
extended family members. Consequently, the parent, rather than
the court, is in the best position to determine what appointment
will be in the best interests of the children.76 Additionally,
custodial parents are best suited to facilitate a transition to a new
caretaker. As a result, deference to those parents' choices can
provide certainty for children at a critical juncture in their lives.
were placed on her guardianship. For example, if she remarried her guardianship would
lapse and be transferred to another. Holmes v. Field, 12 I11. 424 (1851). Application of the
"best interests" standard in this context appears to have its roots, at least in part, in cases
that arose out of situations in which a father appointed someone other than a child's mother
to be the guardian upon the father's death. To avoid this unwise result, the "best interests"
exception permitted them to review the merits of the father's decision. See, e.g., Anonymous,
6 Grant. Ch. 632 (Can. 1858).
75. Whether or not an investigation takes place varies from state to state. In New York,
for example, investigations are routinely done in all guardianship cases to insure that the
prospective guardian has not been convicted of child abuse or related offenses. In Maryland,
however, no such investigation is required.
76. As one court stated:
No person is in a position to know as well who should have the custody of
children as the surviving parent. They are his flesh and blood. He has observed
them throughout their lives. By daily contact he knows their temperaments and
habits, and by observation he knows those who have evidenced the greatest
interest in his children, and those whose moral and spiritual values are in his
judgment conducive to the best interests of his children. A judge treads on sacred
ground when he overrides the directions of the deceased with reference to the
custody of his children.
Comerford v. Cherry, 100 So. 2d 385, 390 (Fla. 1958).
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* VI. Standby Guardianship Provides Stability and Continuity for
the Children Impacted by Parents Suffering from AIDS
The best interests standard utilized by the courts to determine
the proper placement of children has been appropriately criticized
as indeterminate and ineffective in contexts other than standby
guardianship." Its application often results in prolonged and
bitter disputes between parents enmeshed in custody battles. In the
standby guardianship context, however, in which only one parent's
wishes are typically at issue, no justification for contradicting that
parent's plan for future care of her children exists.7" If we defer
to the autonomous decision-making power of parents while they
are raising their children, their choice of caretaker upon their
deaths should be respected, absent extraordinary circumstances.
Respecting the custodial parent's choice in the standby
guardianship context is even more compelling than in the testamen-
tary guardianship context because it is likely that the standby has
begun to act as the guardian prior to the parent's death. Existing
data indicates that providing this certainty and stability for children
at a time of great loss is of critical importance.79
In his book Loss: Sadness and Depression, John Bowlby
summarizes much of the work that has been done regarding
children and loss."° In his attempt to ascertain why some children
77. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975); Robert H. Mnooken & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950,
972, 979 (1979); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards Revitalization of Family Law, 69
TEx. L. REV. 245, 287 (1990) (book review); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the
Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987). It is true, however, that the "best
interests" standard is an advancement over prior standards for resolving custody disputes in
that it forces the contestants to defend their claims in terms of what will be best for the
children. Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 302 (1988).
78. Of course, in probate a will would also be subject to the usual challenges, e.g., the
testator was not competent at the time she signed it, she was subject to undue influence, etc.
A standby guardianship appointment could be challenged on similar grounds.
79. See, e.g., Elizur & Kaffman, Factors Influencing the Severity of Childhood
Bereavement Reactions, 53 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 668 (1983) (describing results of a
longitudinal study of 25 pre-adolescent Kibbutz children who lost their fathers during the
October War of 1973).
80. JOHN BOWLBY, Loss: SADNESS AND DEPRESSION 311-19 (1980).
After surveying the literature in the field, Bowlby concludes:
Amongst all those who have surveyed different groups of individuals who have
lost a parent during childhood, there is now substantial agreement in regard to the
enormous importance of a child's experience after the loss. Individuals who later
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develop a psychiatric disorder after the death of a parent while
others do not, Bowlby identifies three factors as significant: First,
the causes and circumstances of the loss, including what the child
is told and the child's opportunities to inquire about the loss, are
particularly important. Second, the family relationships after the
loss, including whether the child remains with a surviving parent
and how the relationship with that parent is affected by the loss,
must be considered. Finally, relationships within the family prior
to the loss are a significant factor.8
Bowlby's survey of the literature of childhood bereavement
concludes that the child's experience after the loss of a parent is of
critical importance. Those developing a psychiatric disorder later
in life are much more likely to have received deficient parental
attention following their loss. Breakup of the home and frequent
changes in the child's caregiver have a severe impact on those
children and may result in neurotic illness or delinquent behavior.
In fact, Bowlby concludes that the majority of pathological
outcomes of bereavement are a result of the interaction of adverse
conditions following bereavement with the mourning processes set
in action by it. He indicates that discontinuities of care, temporary
foster homes, and other factors have proved to be very detrimental
to the child. Bowlby also indicates that there is a consensus among
the experts regarding the importance of the continuity of care a
child receives after the loss of a parent.
Children in families affected by HIV are likely to be at high
risk in each of the categories identified by Bowlby. Often children
of HIV-positive parents are not informed about the cause of their
parent's illness.8 2 In other situations, the children know about the
develop a psychiatric disorder, it is found, are far more likely than those who do
not, to have received deficient parental care following the loss. Discontinuities of
care, including being cared for in unloving foster homes or institutions and of
being moved from one 'home' to another, have been the lots of many.
Id. at 312. Bowlby rejects traditional theories which held that children, and even adolescents,
cannot mourn due to their psychological immaturity, and that emotional problems following
a parent's death are the result of "arrested development." Id. at 318.
81. Id. Bowlby's conclusions are echoed by those of Elizur and Kaffman, supra note
79. Elizur and Kaffman conclude that the child's family life prior to the loss and the
availability of a supportive and stable family environment afterwards are critical factors
impacting the child's ability to make a favorable adjustment.
82. See THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF WELL ADOLESCENTS IN FAMILIES WITH
AIDS: A STUDY OF CLIENTS OF THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRA-
TION, NATIONAL INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH. One of the major problems identified by the
study is that because of the stigma attached to the HIV infection, many parents never inform
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illness, but it is kept a family secret. They cannot discuss the illness
with others for fear of an adverse reaction due to the stigma
attached to HIV. This complicates the grieving process immeasur-
ably.
Moreover, since the majority of HIV-positive women are single
parents,83 with the second parent absent or appearing only occa-
sionally, the children often have no second parent to whom they
can turn for support. Additionally, many of these children are
being raised in families that have experienced serious problems
even prior to the onset of HIV. A substantial percentage of HIV-
positive mothers contract HIV through drug use.' Many others
contract the virus through sexual contact with a drug using male
partner.85 Thus, we have a group of children that are already at
high risk prior to the death of their parents.
Available data highlights the importance of providing a smooth
transition to a new, stable home for children who lose a parent to
HIV. Ideally, the new home should have a caregiver with whom
the child already has developed a positive relationship. It should
be a place where the child can feel comfortable discussing the loss
of his or her parent, including the illness and its history, without
fearing judgmental responses. The court should defer to the
parent's choice absent evidence that the choice will be detrimental
to the child, and should not engage in a de novo assessment of
what it deems to be in the child's best interest. The court should
consider several factors, including whether the parent had been the
primary custodian in the months or years prior to his or her death.
If a parent had been the primary custodian, it seems appropriate to
their children of the cause of their illness. Even those children who were aware of the cause
of their parent's illness often found it impossible to share this information with others and
gain much needed support. For example, in this study, adolescents in 40 families were
surveyed to learn how they were coping with the news of their parent's HIV status. About
62% of those interviewed indicated that they did "have a best friend." None of these
children interviewed had disclosed the fact of their parent's HIV illness to their best friend,
and less than half had an opportunity to talk with a counselor about their family situation.
83. See Waysdorf, supra note 4, at 170 ("As already noted, most women with HIV
infection and AIDS are mothers or are pregnant. Most of these women are single mothers
and are the primary caregivers for more than one child .... ).
84. See HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 8 (showing 39% of
reported female adult and adolescent AIDS cases in the "intervenous drug use exposure"
category).
85. Id. (showing nearly 20% of reported female adult and adolescent AIDS cases in
"sex with injecting drug user" exposure category).
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assume that the parent knew the child well and knew who would
best provide for the child's care.
The court also should consider who the child has been residing
with during the pending of the guardianship proceeding. The issue
of continuity and stability for the child is of critical importance.86
In most standby guardianship situations, the guardian already will
have begun to function in this role prior to the death of the parent.
The parent will be encouraging the child to develop a relationship
with this new parental figure. Deference to the parent's choice
provides certainty for these children at critical junctures in their
lives. It is very disruptive and upsetting to the children to have this
relationship and plan thrown into turmoil simultaneously with the
parent's death. As described above, existing data indicates that
stability and emotional support in the child's environment after a
parent's death is extremely important.87 Uncertainty about where
the child will live and who will care for her is damaging, and
interferes with the child's mourning process. 88
Next, the court should consider whether the children are
sufficiently mature to be consulted about their wishes as to whom
the guardian should be. In many states, if neither parent is serving
in this capacity and no testamentary appointment has been made,
children over the age of fourteen are permitted by statute to
designate their own guardian.89  Even younger children are likely
to have preferences worthy of the court's consideration. 90 Howev-
er, the child's choice should not override the parent's unless it is
86. See BOWLBY, supra note 80, at 311-19.
87. A primary value of deferring to the custodial parent's choice is that it will usually
mean a smooth and certain transition to a new caretaker. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53-64 (1973). These authors' recommendation
that the courts look for the "least detrimental alternative," rather than the idealized "best
interests of the child," has relevance here. Id.
88. BOWLBY, supra note 80. Bowlby describes the literature on the grieving process of
children. One of the sources he cites concludes that the consequences of a parent's death
may be at least as important, and perhaps more important, than the death itself. In his
opinion, it is such things as the break-up of the home and frequent changes in care giver that
impact severely on children, and may result in neurotic illness or delinquent behavior. Id.
at 311-19.
89. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-702 (1991) (providing that children age
14 or older may designate their own guardian).
90. See Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings: The
Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287 (1983); David M. Siegel &




established that the parent's choice will be detrimental to the
child.91
Another important consideration addresses the potential risks
involved in encouraging parents to plan for their children and
deferring to these choices. Undoubtedly, some situations may arise
in which the parent's feelings and desires may conflict with what
would traditionally be thought to be in the best interest of the
child. For example, a mother might be estranged from members of
her or the father's family who might be willing to provide a home
for the children. However, those relatives will have the opportuni-
ty to challenge the mother's choice. If they can convince the court
that the mother's choice will in fact be detrimental to the child,
then they may be considered as potential guardians. However,
there should not be an automatic presumption in favor of relatives,
which would override the mother's choice.92 If the mother has
been estranged from relatives, it is likely that the child has had
little or no relationship with these relatives. As a result, placement
with a family friend whom the child knows and loves may be better
for the child.
One question that may arise in reviewing a parent's guardian-
ship appointment is what to do if a child has already been removed
from her parent and placed in foster care. The fact that a parent
does not presently have custody is not a complete obstacle to
executing a standby guardian designation. Even when a child is
removed for abuse or neglect, the parent retains her parental rights,
and should be consulted about her child's future. If a parent has
designated a standby guardian, the court should evaluate that
91. Ideally, in every custody or guardianship case, counsel for the child should be
available. Unfortunately, this is not the current situation. Judges can and should discuss
with the child privately the child's feelings about the proposed custody or guardianship
arrangement. If the child has misgivings at that point, counsel for the child could be
appointed to explore further.
As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse points out, children have a very different, experience-
based perception of family relationships that has too long been ignored by our family law
system. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993).
92. Although courts tend to look first to the family as potential guardians, this may not
always be in the child's interest. The child will need support and understanding to grieve the
loss of the parent, and family members who were estranged from the parent may not be able
to provide the support and understanding the child will need. There is still a great deal of
fear and hostility towards people with AIDS. Family members who are unable to be




choice to determine if the placement would be detrimental to the
child. The court should not, however, evaluate the parent's choice
of a standby guardian applying the same criteria that it would apply
to a potential foster parent, since those criteria would eliminate
many families with limited resources who nevertheless are capable
of providing a good home.
Imagine, for example, the following scenario: Because of her
illness, a mother places her three-year-old daughter in foster care
three weeks prior to being hospitalized. Having no good choices
available to her, she has not yet designated a standby guardian.
After hearing about the mother's illness for the first time, however,
the mother's sister moves back into the area to care for her and her
daughter. Certainly, in this a situation, the mother's wishes should
be respected, and the daughter should be returned to her care.
Unfortunately, however, once a child is in the foster care system,
the system tends to disregard the initial cause for the placement
and takes on a life of its own.93 It is not always a simple matter
to terminate a foster care placement, even a voluntary placement
such as this.94 The system needs to be reformed to take the
circumstances of each individual case into consideration.
As another example, suppose a five-year-old child were placed
in foster care due to neglect by her mother who is addicted to
drugs. The child has been in foster care for one year. The mother
executes a standby guardianship designation, even though she does
not presently have custody of her child. The fact that the mother
has not been the custodial parent for an extended period would be
an appropriate factor to consider in evaluating her choice of a
guardian. However, the mother does retain parental rights in this
situation, and should be consulted about long-term planning for her
child. If the parent informs social services that she has a relative or
93. Maryland, for example, has regulations that authorize voluntary placement. MD.
REGS. CODE tit. 7 § 07.02.11.06A (1973). However, voluntary placements are actively
discouraged, and the vast majority of placements result in commitment of the child to DSS.
Thus, DSS and/or a court must agree before the child can be removed from foster care. MD.
REGS. CODE tit. 7 § 07.02.11.22 A, B, & C (1973). This principle has developed in part
because federal funds are available to pay for foster care where a judge has determined that
such a placement is necessary. Funds are not as-readily available for voluntary placements.
94. In Maryland, although voluntary placements are authorized by regulation, MD.
REGS. CODE tit. 7 § 07.02.11.06A (1973), in practice they are discouraged. Typically, a
parent seeking to voluntarily place a child on a temporary basis is asked to agree to
commitment of the child to the custody of DSS, meaning that the parent loses substantial
control over when and if the child will be returned.
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friend that is willing to care for her child, DSS should explore that
placement. This may very well provide a better option for the child
when compared to an indefinite foster care placement."
VII. Other Issues Which Must Be Addressed To Facilitate the
Useful Implementation of Standby Guardianship Statutes
A. The Need for Assistance for Terminally Ill Parents and
Potential Guardians
Meaningful implementation of standby guardianship requires
a great deal more than passing the relevant statutes. Implementa-
tion requires an organized effort to educate judges, lawyers, social
workers, and case workers about the existence and purpose of this
legislation. Moreover, these individuals must recognize that parents
and guardians will require assistance to implement a standby
guardianship appointment. For example, terminally ill parents must
be informed of their options under standby guardianship, and will
require assistance to prepare the appropriate papers to express
their wishes for their children. These parents will also need
assistance to negotiate through the court system.96
95. DSS policy is to explore family placements wherever possible. However, they
typically will not explore placements with non-relatives, such as family friends. This is in
conflict with standby guardianship, which places no limitation on who the potential guardian
might be.
The combination of the unpredictable course of HIV disease and the difficulty faced
by any parent trying to overcome a drug addiction renders "permanency" planning for
children impacted by HIV especially difficult. See Victor Groze et al., Barriers in Perma-
nency Planning for Medically Fragile Children: Drug Affected Children and HIV Infected
Children, 11 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. No. 1 (1994).
However, drug-addicted parents should be consulted and involved in future plans for
their children, even if they are currently unable to care for them. In some cases, the parents
may be living on the street and truly uninvolved and unable to contribute much, if anything,
to their children's welfare. Often, however, parents struggling with an addiction need
support to regain the ability to care for their children. They may very well have information
that would be helpful to the agency making a plan for the child.
96. Maryland has already begun this process of outreach and education. For example,
it has convened an ad hoc committee to assist in implementing this new legislation.
Committee members include representatives of the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, the Department of Social Services Chief Counsel's Office, HERO, Prince George's
County Health Department, and the AIDS Administration. Additionally, student attorneys
in the AIDS clinic, working under the supervision of myself and Professor Joyce McConnell,
have prepared an excellent manual on standby guardianship, including draft pleadings. We
have filed the first cases under this new statute.
During the spring semester of 1995, a class of twenty-five students, working with
Professors Joyce McConnell and Karen Czapanskiy are continuing the project. Students are
going out to community groups, including Head Start, medical clinics, neighborhood
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In addition, financial assistance for the intended guardian
undoubtedly will become an issue in many cases. The parent's
relatives or friends may need financial assistance to take on this
new responsibility.97 In some situations, at least some public aid
may be available. However, in other situations, such as if the
guardian is not a relative, these public benefits may not be
available.98  Many deceased parents will have three or four
children for whom care must be provided. Rarely can a family
member manage to take on two, three, or even four children
without some source of financial assistance. Friends of the ill
parent are at an even greater disadvantage, as they typically will be
unable to obtain even AFDC for the children for which they agree
to provide care. Legislators must revise eligibility guidelines at the
state and federal level to meet the needs of these children and their
new caretakers.
B. The Role of Absentee Fathers in the Guardianship Decision
Another issue that courts must consider in the standby
guardianship context is the reappearance of absentee fathers the
time of death of the custodial mother. These fathers may attempt
to assert control over their children at that time. As a result,
mothers facing a terminal illness will be concerned about the future
of their children under the father's control. Their concerns
sometimes include a history of abuse by the absent father, but more
often involve his financial and emotional abandonment of the
family. Sometimes the father's family will attempt to step in at the
time of the mother's death, raising the recurring question of how
a conflict between the custodial mother's wishes and the paternal
relatives should be resolved. As described above, deference to the
mother's wishes seems preferable in most situations. However, the
children should not be denied a relationship with their paternal
relatives. If it appears to be in the child's interest, visits with these
organizations, and PTAs, to educate people in the community about this new legislation.
97. See Waysdorf, supra note 4, at 197.
98. Under federal law, non-relative caretakers, even if legal guardians, cannot qualify
for Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC). Federal law defines "dependent
child" as one "who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister,
stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew or niece."
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1985).
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relatives should certainly be encouraged. 99 However, the court
should respect the mother's wishes with regard to custody, unless
it is established that her choice is likely to be detrimental to the
children.
When the non-custodial parent is not in regular contact with
the children, the court should not require an attempt to gain
consent to appointment of a guardian."° Reasonable efforts to
provide notice of the guardianship appointment would be required,
and the non-custodial parent would have the right to request a
hearing for the opportunity to argue against the appointment.
However, if the noncustodial parent is not seeking custody for
himself, the court should not allow him to challenge the custodial
parent's guardianship appointment, unless he can establish that the
guardianship appointment would be in some way detrimental to the
children. This practice would promote deference to the custodial
parent's choice, limit litigation, and provide more certainty for the
children.
Some critics may argue that a presumption in favor of the
custodial parent's choice of guardian could run afoul of the
principles developed by the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illi-
nois.t'O In Stanley, the Court was explicit in its objection to a
presumption that all unmarried fathers were unfit parents.
102
99. Generally, extended family members do not have the right to demand such
visitation, but courts may grant it if they find it to be in the child's best interest. In addition,
an increasing number of states have enacted statutes giving grandparents the right to seek
visitation with grandchildren under certain circumstances. See Michelle M. Price, Comment,
West Virginia's New Grandparent Visitation Statute: A Step in the Right Direction, 95 W. VA.
L. REV. 535 (1992-93).
100. Maryland Law requires that all persons with "parental rights" join in the petition,
unless they cannot be found after reasonable efforts to locate them have been made. MD.
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-901(a) (1994). New York's statute does not require this.
101. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Although as a Constitutional matter, a putative father who has
had no or minimal contact with his children is not necessarily entitled even to notice in this
situation. Which seems on balance to be appropriate. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983) (holding that notice to child's putative father, who had not supported and rarely
visited his child, was not required in adoption proceeding, as father had failed to file with
registry that would have guaranteed notice). However, notice simply informs the father of
what is happening, and gives him the opportunity to be heard. In the long term, especially
when children have lost one parent to AIDS, they may benefit from having some relationship
with their father and his family. See also Shanley, supra note 22.
102. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649. The Court proclaimed:
Is a presumption that distinguishes and burdens us all unwed fathers constitution-
ally repugnant? We conclude that, as a matter of due process of law, Stanley [the
father] was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were
taken from him and that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other
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What is proposed here, however, is substantially different from the
presumption in Stanley. If the non-custodial parent wishes to seek
custody for himself, despite limited contact with the children, he
will be given the opportunity to be heard. However, unless he is
in the position to assume full custodial care of the children, he will
not be given the opportunity to disrupt the plan that the mother
has already begun to implement, unless he can show that the
confirmation of this appointment would be detrimental to the
children.
However, this is not the end of the consideration of the non-
custodial parent's rights in this situation. The court has the
authority to grant the father ongoing visitation with the children,
assuming there is no finding that this would be adverse to the
children's interest. Peggy Davis, a Law Professor and former
Family Court Judge, concludes that children often have a great
need to maintain ties with their biological parents, and need
assistance in integrating multiple parental figures into their
lives. 1°3
Historically, under the abuse and neglect system, if a parent is
unable to take on full custodial care for a child within a mandated
period of time, child welfare will move to terminate parental rights.
However, this is not always in the best interest of the child.
Although a child does need a parent who will provide stability, it
does not necessarily follow that permitting visits with the natural
parent will be disruptive or harmful. These decisions should be
made on a case-by-case basis. For example, if a father wishes to
remain involved in the child's life, but is unable to assume full
custodial care, visits may be in the child's best interest. °4 When
parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
103. Peggy C. Davis, Use and Abuse of Power to Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 557 (1983-1984); see also David Fanshel, Urging Restraint in Terminating
the Rights of Parents of Children in Foster Care, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 501
(1983-84).
104. Although Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's ideas in Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 87, and their later book, Before the Best Interests of the Child (1979), have
had tremendous influence on the law governing child welfare decisions, some of their
conclusions have been the subject of substantial criticism. For example, they have concluded
that a child's need for stability and security requires exclusivity in parental relationships. A
"visiting parent," in their view, contributes little to the child's development and may prove
destructive. However, Carol Stack, among others, has criticized this conclusion as failing to
acknowledge the reality that shared parenting among extended family members is the norm
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a child has lost one parent, this connection to the surviving parent
may prove especially important. Such children can be assured
stability by making it clear in appropriate cases that the natural
parent has lost the right to assume custody in the future and will be
limited to visitation only.
C. Identifying a Guardian
A final issue that may arise under standby guardianship
involves finding a guardian when parents are unable to identify a
family member or friend who is able to take full responsibility for
their children after their deaths. The New York Child Welfare
Administration has recently implemented a pilot program known
as the "Early Planning Project," which is trying to address this
issue. The Child Welfare Administration has recognized the value
of encouraging and assisting families impacted by HIV in planning
for the future care of their children. The Project is specifically
designed to aid families who have been unable to locate a family
member or friend who is willing and able to care for the children
without financial assistance. The Project will assist parents in
finding a foster home for their children. Unlike the CINA system,
the Project sees its role as empowering parents to make decisions
for their children, and workers do their best to assist in carrying out
parents' wishes, as long as those wishes do not result in potential
danger to the children. 5
The Project gives terminally ill parents and their children the
opportunity to meet the prospective foster family to see if they will
be a comfortable match. The Project also encourages contact
between the foster parents and the family prior to the placement
of the children in the foster home. In theory, the children will live
with the foster parents if their parent is hospitalized or simply
needs respite care, and then will return to their original home.
However, this new Project has several weaknesses that stem
from the Project's connection with the traditional dependency
in many communities. See CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN
A BLACK COMMUNITY (1974); Carol Stack, Cultural Perspectives in Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 546 (1983-84).
For an excellent discussion of the need to consider separately issues of the permanent
loss of custody from the termination of all parental rights, see Marsha Garrison, Why
Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1983).
105. Conversation with Regina Prince, Director of the Early Permanency Planning
Project, New York, N.Y. (Apr. 16, 1993).
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system, and the limitations of family law as presently written."t 6
Even the "Early Planning Project," which has as its stated goal the
empowerment of parents to make plans for their children, contains
the seeds of the parent's disenfranchisement. For example, a
parent participating in the Project must sign a Voluntary Placement
Agreement. 17 By signing this Agreement, these parents are
transferring the care and custody of their children to the Commis-
sioner of Social Services. The foster care placement is treated just
like any other placement, and parents are warned that a reviewing
court has the authority to direct the agency to work towards
discharging the child from foster care to either the parent's home
or to a potential new adoptive home.1"8
In essence, parents then lose all meaningful control over the
future care of their children. Although the agency theoretically
must return the children to their parents as requested, the agency
explicitly reserves the right to block the return by seeking a court
order. The likelihood of a child being returned at the request of
a parent is remote when the child has already been placed out of
the home and when the parent is suffering from a terminal illness.
While the Agreement provides that the agency must return the
child within twenty days unless a court order exists or has been
obtained to prevent the return, the standard that a court must
apply in considering whether to honor a parent's request is not at
106. The guidelines for the Project refer to a situation in which the parent may be offered
the option of surrendering parental rights. This should be discussed only in cases in which
the parent feels comfortable with adoption proceedings beginning prior to his or her death.
It is suggested that this may be useful to a parent who wants to insure that certain relatives
will be unable to assume custody upon the parent's death.
Relinquishment of parental rights should not be necessary. The new adoptive parents
should be confirmed with their status to take effect immediately upon the parent's death.
For example, a father and mother are permitted to share guardianship of their children, and
no one demands that there be only one person making parental decisions. However, medical
providers and social services workers are apt to be disoriented by the idea of a mother and
grandmother sharing guardianship rights, even though this is the family's everyday reality.
See Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents, and Grandchildren, Actualizing Interdependen-
cy in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315 (1994) (urging legal recognition of co-parenting by mother
and grandmother).
It is also important to note that it is being suggested that this option be made available
to parents, not that it be imposed upon them. Such a sharing of responsibility is likely to
work well only if both people willingly enter into such a relationship.
107. See EARLY PERMANENCY PLANNING PROJECT, INTAKE PROCEDURES 4 (on file with
author).
108. See EARLY PERMANENCY PLANNING PROJECT, VOLUNTARY PLACEMENT




all clear. However, it appears that this standard will be much
broader than a simple inquiry into whether a child will be at risk
for neglect. Yet, the parent's request to have the child returned
home should only be denied when substantial evidence exists that
a parent's incapacity to care for the child will put the child at risk.
To avoid placement of the child in foster care, funds should be
made available to pay for an in-home aid who could help with
housework, preparing meals, and other necessary tasks when
appropriate. In theory, this system would be consistent with
federal legislation mandating that reasonable efforts be made to
avoid placing a child in foster care." In practice, however, such
resources are often unavailable.1 ' Presumably, many attorneys
would have a very difficult time recommending to clients that they
sign the Agreement as written, unless they were ready to perma-
nently relinquish the care and custody of their child to a foster
family.
VIII. Conclusion
The current trend towards enacting standby guardianship
statutes and other innovative programs with the goal of empower-
ing terminally ill parents to plan for the future of their children is
a positive one. It is an unusual step towards respecting the
autonomy of poor parents that is long overdue.' However,
much work needs to be done to ensure that these statutes are
implemented with this respect in mind. Education of all those
involved, including judges, attorneys, social workers, medical
providers, and parents is essential."t 2 In addition, some allocation
of financial resources to support standby guardians is necessary.
For those families in which no relative or friend is available to step
109. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1985).
110. See STUDY OF BLACK CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, supra note 30.
111. Obviously, there is a tremendous need to address in a broader way the unequal
treatment of poor families by the child welfare system, but that is beyond the scope of this
article.
112. In Maryland, we have already begun this process. We have brought together
representatives of the foster care system, social workers who work with HIV positive parents,
counsel to the Department of Social Services, and attorneys who work with these clients, to
discuss how best to implement this new statute. We have begun meeting with judges to
discuss with them our concerns about implementation, such as, confidentiality of client's
medical status and expedited treatment for these cases. Student attorneys in our clinical
program, working under the manual on standby guardianship, went out to community groups
such as Head Start and PTAs to educate community members about this new legislation.
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in and care for their children, a new placement system is desperate-
ly needed. Such a system must be separate from the abuse and
neglect foster care system already in place, and must respect the
dignity and autonomy of ill parents and their families.
